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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1992). The 
appeal was timely filed before the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989) and was properly transferred to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue before the Court of Appeals is whether the Tax 
Commission correctly found that the Petitioner's proposed Sale 
and Leaseback Agreement involved a transaction subject to sales 
tax pursuant to the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act. 
The Utah Legislature has recently modified the standard of 
review to be applied on appeals from the Utah State Tax 
Commission. The proper standard of review for the Tax 
Commission's conclusions of law is a correction of error 
standard. See Taxpayer Appeal from Administrative Rulings, S.B. 
No. 243 (1993) (adding § 59-1-610(1)(b) to the Utah Code). For 
findings of fact, the standard of review grants deference to the 
agency's findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. 
Id. (adding § 59-1-610(1)(a) to the Utah Code). The issue 
before the Court of Appeals in this case involves a combined 
issue of fact and law. 
The Legislature, in enacting the new standards of review, 
1 
did not specify the proper standard to be applied when an issue 
involves both factual findings and legal conclusions. However, 
under earlier law, the Utah Supreme Court has applied an 
intermediate standard for such issues. This intermediate 
standard essentially required the reviewing court to assure that 
the agency's findings fell within the bounds of reasonableness.1 
Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 
610 (1983). Since the Utah Legislature has failed to provide a 
standard of review for mixed findings of fact and law, this Court 
should revert to the prior intermediary standard as developed by 




Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10) (1992) 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a), (k) (1992) 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(27) (1992) 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-610(1) (S.B. No. 243 (1993)) 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(37) (Supp. 1989) (amended 1990) 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(37) (1990) 
1
 The Utah Supreme Court has summarized the development of 
the intermediate standard of review in Morton Int'l, Inc. v. 




Utah Admin R. R865-19-32S (1992) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case comes before the Utah Court of Appeals from a Tax 
Commission Declaratory Order dated December 11, 1992• (Appendix 
A, R. 5). The Declaratory Order essentially held that the lease 
transaction of the Petitioner's (hereinafter "Matrix") proposed 
Sale and Leaseback Agreement would be subject to sales tax. 
Matrix's proposed Sale and Leaseback Agreement provides that 
Matrix will purchase furniture and equipment (hereinafter 
"equipment") from a "Customer." The Customer will then agree to 
lease the equipment back for a period of sixty months with a 
purchase option at the end of the lease term. (R. 6). 
The crux of Matrix's argument before the Tax Commission and 
now before the Court of Appeals is that the proposed agreement is 
merely a financing arrangement rather than two separate 
transactions, a sale and a lease. For support of this argument, 
Matrix argues that the Customer's leaseback of the equipment from 
Matrix is not a "true lease" under the Uniform Commercial Code's 
("UCC") definition of a "security interest." See Utah Code Ann. 
S 70A-1-201(37) (1990) (Utah's version of the UCC is found in 
title 70A of the Utah Code). Matrix further argues that if the 
lease is considered a financing arrangement, then no sales tax 
can be assessed since loans are not transactions subject to sales 
3 
tax. 
The Tax Commission rejected Matrix's argument and instead 
found that under the proposed agreement there would be a distinct 
and separate sale of the equipment from the Customer to Matrix. 
The Tax Commission based its finding upon the express language of 
the proposed contracts which state that title to the equipment 
will pass to Matrix. (Appendix A, R. 5). Having found that 
there would be a sale under the first transaction (the sale from 
the Customer to Matrix), it was not necessary for the Tax 
Commission to determine whether the second transaction (the 
leaseback by Matrix to the Customer) would constitute a true 
lease or a financing arrangement. If the second transaction is a 
true lease, it is subject to sales tax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-
12-103(1)(k) (1992). If it is a financing arrangement, it is 
subject to sales tax as a sale from Matrix to the Customer, with 
Matrix retaining a security interest. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-
12-102(10) (1992). Thus, it was irrelevant to the Tax Commission 
whether the second transaction was a true lease or a financing 
arrangement since under either scenario the transaction would be 
subject to sales tax. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Matrix and Respondent have agreed to a stipulation of facts. 
(Revised Stipulation of Facts, Appendix B, R. 84). The facts 
relevant for this appeal are summarized below as follows. 
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1. Matrix will enter into a Sale and Leaseback Agreement 
with Customer which will consist of two transactions. (Sale and 
Leaseback Agreement, hereinafter "Sale Agreement," Appendix C, R. 
90). 
2. The first transaction is Matrix's purchase of equipment 
from the Customer. The second transaction is a lease of this 
same equipment by Matrix back to the Customer and is further 
evidenced by a separate Master Lease Agreement. (Master Lease 
Agreement, hereinafter "Lease Agreement," Appendix D, R. 93; 
Revised Stipulation of Facts f 1, Appendix B, R. 84). 
2. The Sale Agreement states that title to the equipment 
will pass from the seller, the Customer, to the buyer, Matrix. 
(Revised Stipulation of Facts 5 3, Appendix B, R. 85). 
Throughout the Sale Agreement, the terms "buyer" and "seller" are 
used to refer to Matrix and the Customer respectively. (Appendix 
C, R. 90-92). 
3. Matrix has stipulated that it will purchase the 
equipment from the Customer at a price roughly equivalent to 72% 
of the Customer's original purchase price. (Stipulation of Facts 
f 1, Appendix B, R. 84). 
4. The Lease Agreement provides that the Customer will 
make sixty monthly payments. (Equipment Schedule, Appendix D, R. 
102). If the Consumer Price Index (CPI) increases for any month 
during the first twelve months, then the thirteenth through 
sixtieth payments will increase to 128% of the original payment 
5 
amount, (Revised Stipulation of Facts 5 7, Appendix B, R. 86), 
5. The Lease Agreement contains an option for the Customer 
to purchase the equipment at the end of the sixty month lease. 
(Equipment Schedule, Appendix D, R. 102-03). 
6. The option price is calculated as a percentage of the 
original price that Matrix paid the Customer for the equipment. 
The option price is 46% of the price Matrix paid the Customer if 
there is no increase in the monthly payments after the first 
twelve months; otherwise, the option price is 19% of the amount 
Matrix paid the Customer. (Revised Stipulation of Facts f 7, 
Appendix B, R. 86). 
7. If the Customer chooses not to exercise its purchase 
option, Matrix will retain title and take possession of the 
equipment. In this event the Customer is required to pay Matrix 
a sum equal to 19% of the original price that Matrix paid the 
Customer for the equipment. (Revised Stipulation of Facts 5 7, 
Appendix B, R. 86). 
8. The Lease Agreement refers to Matrix as the "lessor" 
and the Customer as the "lessee." It further refers to the 
monthly payments to be made under the lease as "Monthly Rental." 
(Appendix D, R. 93). Moreover, the Lease Agreement provides that 
the equipment "shall at all times remain the property of the 
Lessor or its Purchasers. Lessor may affix (or require the 
Lessee to affix) tags, decals or plates to the Equipment 
indicating Lessor's ownership, and Lessee shall not permit their 
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removal or concealment." (Appendix D, R. 95). 
9. The Customer will record depreciation on the equipment 
and use the equipment for the term of the lease. (Revised 
Stipulation of Facts f 11, Appendix B, R. 87). 
10. Both the Customer and Matrix will treat the agreement 
as a financing arrangement on their Federal and State income tax 
returns. (Revised Stipulation of Facts 1 llf Appendix B, R. 87). 
11. Matrix believes that the lease transaction will be 
treated as a financing agreement rather than as a true lease. 
(Revised Stipulation of Facts I 5, Appendix B, R. 85). In 
contrast, Matrix presumes that the lease will be treated under 
Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB] Standard 13 as an 
operational lease, not a capital lease. (Revised Stipulation of 
Facts 5 6, Appendix Bf R. 85). 
12. The useful life of the equipment is estimated to be ten 
to thirteen years from the date Matrix purchases the equipment. 
(Stipulation of Facts 5 12, Appendix B, R. 87). 
13. At the time the purchase option may be exercised, the 
Customer estimates that the fair market value of the equipment 
will be 50% of the original price that Matrix paid the Customer 
for the equipment. (Stipulation of Facts I 12, Appendix B, R. 
88). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Tax Commission's decision should be affirmed since it 
correctly applied the relevant provisions of the Utah Sales and 
Use Tax Act. The Tax Commission was correct in finding that a 
sale would occur since title to the equipment would be 
transferred from the Customer to Matrix pursuant to the contract. 
Similarly, the Tax Commission was correct in holding that 
Matrix's lease of the equipment back to the Customer would be 
subject to sales tax. 
The Tax Commission's decision is supported by case law in 
other jurisdictions which have recognized two transactions under 
similar sale and leaseback agreements. In Matrix's case, the 
first transaction is the sale of the equipment from the Customer 
to Matrix. This sale is conclusively shown by the transfer of 
title. The second transaction is the lease of the equipment by 
Matrix to the Customer. 
Matrix's argument, that this second transaction is not a 
true lease but merely a financing agreement, is misplaced for two 
reasons. First, even if the second transaction is not a true 
lease, it would still be subject to sales tax as a sale with 
Matrix retaining a security interest. Second, the lease 




I. THERE ARE TWO DISTINCT TRANSACTIONS - FIRST, 
A SALE FROM THE CUSTOMER TO MATRIX - SECOND, 
A LEASE FROM MATRIX TO THE CUSTOMER. 
Matrix would have this Court review both transactions which 
are contemplated by the Sale and Leaseback Agreement as a single 
transaction. This approach is flawed- Pursuant to the 
agreement, there are two transactions which the parties will 
enter into. The first transaction is the sale of the equipment 
to Matrix from the Customer. The second transaction is Matrix's 
lease of the equipment to the Customer. It is proper to analyze 
the application of the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act to each 
transaction. 
A. The first transaction. 
The first transaction encompasses the sale by the Customer 
to Matrix. The Utah Sales and Use Tax Act has an express 
provision which defines the term "sale" for sales and use tax 
purposes. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10) (1992). Section 
102(10) defines a sale as including "any transfer of title. 
exchange, or barter, conditional or otherwise, in any manner, of 
tangible personal property . . . for a consideration." (Emphasis 
added). Under this definition, a sale will have taken place if 
transfer of title has occurred. Here, the Sales Agreement 
expressly provides that title in the equipment will pass to 
Matrix in consideration of Matrix's purchase of the Customer's 
equipment. As such, the Tax Commission was correct in ruling 
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that there was a sale for sales and use tax purposes. 
Even though this transaction constitutes a sale, it is 
specifically excluded from sales tax by Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
104(28) (1992) which exempts transactions involving tangible 
personal property which is purchased for resale. In this case, 
Matrix's purchase of the equipment will be for resale since it 
will lease the equipment back to the Customer. This lease is 
considered a resale pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10)(e) 
(1992) because the Customer will have possession and use of the 
property during the lease term.2 
Matrix's argument, that the transfer of title is not 
determinative as to a sale, is unpersuasive for two reasons. 
First, the statute is clear and unambiguous in stating that 
transfer of title constitutes a "sale." It is true that a sale 
can occur under the Sales and Use Tax Act without title passing; 
however, when transfer of title does occur it is conclusive 
evidence of a sale. The second reason Matrix's argument is 
unpersuasive is its unjustified reliance upon the UCC definition 
of "sale." Matrix has not provided any evidence which indicates 
that a connection exists between the definition of "sale" 
contained in the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act, and the definition 
2
 Matrix's purchase of the equipment would also be considered 
for resale if the second transaction is deemed a financing 
arrangement. If deemed a financing arrangement, the second 
transaction would be treated as a sale of the equipment by Matrix 
to the Customer, with Matrix retaining a security interest. See 
infra Part I.B. 
10 
of "sale" as provided in the UCC. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-2-
106(1) (1990) (this section contains the UCC definition of sale). 
In this regard, the Utah Supreme Court has stated "[w]hile the 
use of a term in one section may have relevance to its usage in 
another, the plain language of each section must first be 
considered." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Bliss, 725 P.2d 1330, 1333 
(Utah 1986). Thus, the plain language of the Sales and Use Tax 
Act should prevail. See Utah Code Ann. S 59-12-102(10) (1992). 
Matrix has also focused upon the fact that it will never 
have possession of the equipment. It is Matrix's 
misunderstanding that a sale cannot occur unless the purchaser 
has possession of the tangible personal property. Matrix fails 
to recognize that possession is not the only means of determining 
whether a sale has occurred under the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act. 
"Right to possession" is merely one right which could constitute 
a sale. There are other rights that a purchaser may have which 
would also constitute a sale. For instance, the "right to use" 
the tangible personal property will be a sufficient ownership 
right to warrant the recognition of a sale. See Utah Code Ann. § 
59-12-102(10)(e) (1992). Matrix has the right to use the 
equipment since it has the right to lease the equipment. Other 
states have recognized the fact that a "use" exists on the part 
of the lessor by merely leasing the tangible personal property 
even though the lessor has never had actual possession of such 
property. See Gulf Coast Rental Tool Serv., Inc. v. Collector of 
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Revenue, 98 So.2d 704, 707 (La. App. 1957), Rust Tractor v. 
Bureau of Revenue, 475 P.2d 779 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970), Cert, den. 
475 P.2d 778 (N.M. 1970). 
B. The Second Transaction. 
The second transaction occurring under the Sale and 
Leaseback Agreement is the leaseback of the equipment by the 
Customer from Matrix. The Tax Commission, in its decision, held 
that this lease was subject to sales tax pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(k). (R. 8). Section 59-12-103(1)(k) levies 
sales tax upon the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for 
"leases and rentals of tangible personal property." 
Matrix has argued that this second transaction is not 
subject to sales tax since it is not a true lease. However, 
Matrix's argument becomes irrelevant once it has been established 
that a sale occurred in the first transaction. The irrelevancy 
of Matrix's argument can readily be seen by examining the sales 
tax consequences of the second transaction treated both as a 
lease and as a financing arrangement. If the second transaction 
is a true lease, then as it has already been explained, it is 
clearly subject to sales tax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
103(1)(k). If the second transaction is not a true lease, but a 
financing arrangement, then it is still subject to sales tax 
since it would be treated as a sale. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-
12-103(1) and 102(10). In other words, if it is a financing 
arrangement, then the second transaction is an actual resale of 
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the equipment from Matrix to the Customer with Matrix retaining a 
security interest in the equipment. 
Utah Admin. R. R865-19-32S(F) (1992) recognizes the general 
principle that sales tax liability does not turn upon whether a 
transaction is a lease or whether it is a sale accompanied by a 
financing arrangement. Utah Admin. R. R865-19-32S(F) states: 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this rule, 
a lessee may, at its option, treat a conditional sale 
lease as either a sale or lease for sales or use tax 
purposes. 
A conditional sales lease is a lease in which: 
1. the consideration the lessee is to pay the 
lessor for the right to possession and use of 
the property is an obligation for the term of 
the lease not subject to termination by the 
lessee, and 
2. the total consideration to be paid by the 
lessee is fixed at the time the lease is 
executed and cannot be modified by use, 
condition, or market value, and either: 
a. the lessee is bound to become the owner 
of the property; or 
b. the lessee has an option to become the 
owner of the property for no additional 
consideration or nominal additional 
consideration upon compliance with the 
lease agreement. Nominal consideration 
in this sense means ten percent or less 
of the original lease amount. 
(Emphasis Added). Utah Admin. R. R865-19-32S(F) recognizes that 
a lease may be a lease, or it may be a sale with a financing 
arrangement. In either case, the Rule recognizes that the 
transaction is subject to taxation. As such, Matrix's proposed 
Sale and Leaseback Agreement is subject to sales tax regardless 
13 
of whether it is a lease or a financing arrangement. 
C. Other states have recognized that two transactions exist in 
similar sale and leaseback contracts. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized two distinct 
transactions in a sale and leaseback agreement similar to the one 
proposed by Matrix. In Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, 259 N.W.2d 59.'6 (Minn. 1977), the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the lease in a sale and 
leaseback agreement was subject to use tax. In Midwest, a 
contract between Midwest Federal and NCR provided that Midwest 
Federal would sell its equipment to NCR, and simultaneously, 
execute a lease agreement under which the equipment would be 
leased back to Midwest Federal. 
Based upon these facts, the court concluded that two 
transactions had occurred under the sale and leaseback agreement. 
The court rejected Midwest Federal's argument that assessing use 
tax on the leaseback constituted double taxation. In the words 
of the Minnesota Supreme Court; 
[n]o tax was paid on the sale of the equipment to NCR, 
since it was located in New York. The use tax imposed 
by the commissioner is based on the lease of the 
equipment to Midwest Federal, the third of three 
distinct transactions. 
Id. at 599 (emphasis added). The Minnesota Supreme Court found 
three district transactions. The first was Midwest Federal's 
original acquisition of the equipment. The second transaction 
occurred under the terms of the sale and leaseback agreement when 
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NCR purchased the equipment from Midwest Federal. The final 
transaction, also pursuant to the sale and leaseback agreement, 
consisted of NCR's leaseback of the equipment to Midwest Federal. 
This identical situation is present in Matrix's proposed Sale and 
Leaseback Agreement. 
The Arizona Department of Revenue in Honeywell Bull, Inc. 
CRA Inc. v. Arizona Dep't of Revenue, 1990 WL 92009 
(Ariz.Bd.Tax.App, 1990) also found two transactions in a sale and 
leaseback agreement. See Appendix F for a copy of this decision. 
In Honeywell, CRA entered into an agreement with Blue Cross of 
Arizona in which Blue Cross sold its computer to CRA and CRA 
leased the equipment back to Blue Cross. The Arizona Department 
of Revenue considered this to be two transactions; Blue Cross's 
sale of the computer to CRA and the leaseback of the computer by 
Blue Cross. The taxpayer's argument in Honeywell, that it 
intended the agreement to be one transaction, was specifically 
rejected as not "sufficient basis" to justify treating it as one 
transaction. 
A similar conclusion was reached by the Tax Court of Indiana 
in Monarch Beverage v. Department of State Revenue, 589 N.E.2d 
1209 (Ind.Tax 1992). The agreement in Monarch involved three 
parties: Hackney, Monarch, and Gelco. According to the 
agreement, Monarch was to purchase trucks from Hackney. Monarch 
would then enter into a sale and leaseback agreement with Gelco 
whereby Gelco would purchase the trucks from Monarch and then 
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lease the trucks back to Monarch. It was asserted by Monarch 
that in substance only one transaction occurred. The court in 
Monarch rejected this argument and held that "[s]ales and use 
taxes are transactional taxes imposed upon the gross income 
received from a retail transaction. Therefore, sales or use tax 
can be collected more than once on the same item if the item is 
the subject of more than one non-exempt retail transaction." Id. 
at 1216 (citations omitted). 
The court in Monarch reasoned that the sale from Hackney to 
Monarch was taxable. The court also held that the leaseback of 
the equipment by Monarch from Gelco was taxable. Only the sale 
of the equipment by Monarch to Gelco was exempt from taxation 
since Gelco purchased the equipment to lease it back to Monarch. 
Id. at 1214 n.14. The analysis used by the Indiana Tax Court is 
directly applicable to Matrix's proposed agreement. See supra 
part I.A. 
Matrix has cited case law from other jurisdictions which may 
appear to reach a different conclusion than that reached by Tax 
Commission in this case. However, these cases can easily be 
distinguished. For example, Matrix cites Footpress Corp. v. 
Strickland, 251 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. 1978), in support of its argument 
that its Sale and Leaseback Agreement is merely one agreement, a 
financing arrangement. Footpress is distinguishable by the very 
fact that the lessor and lessee were the same company. McCall 
was the lessee and McCall created Footpress for the sole purpose 
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of acting as a lessor in its sale and leaseback agreement. The 
court in Footpress noted that the Commissioner treated "McCall 
and Footpress as identical entities . . . ." Id. at 279. 
Indeed, it would be very difficult to find a sale and a lease 
transaction between the same entity. This unique fact pattern is 
not present in Matrix's situation and was not before the Tax 
Commission. Matrix and the Customer are completely separate and 
independent corporations. Therefore, the decision in Footpress 
is of little relevance to this case. 
Matrix also unjustly relies upon a California case, Cedars-
Sinai Medical Ctr. v. State Bd., 162 Cal. App.3d 1182, 208 
Cal.Rpt. 837 (2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1984). This reliance is 
unjustified since the court construed California's definition of 
"sale" as not requiring a finding of sale when transfer of title 
has occurred.3 Thus, the court in Cedars-Sinai did not find a 
separate sale. In contrast, Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10) 
expressly provides that transfer of title constitutes a sale for 
sales and use tax purposes. Given this distinction between 
California and Utah law, the decision rendered in Cedars-Sinai is 
of little relevance. 
Transamerica Leasing Corp. v. Bureau of Revenue. 450 P.2d 
3
 California's definition of "sale" at issue in Cedars-Sinai 
contained the language "any transfer of title or possession . . . 
Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 6006(a). . The court in Cedars-Sinai 
cited to California precedent which stated that this definition of 
"sale" was intended to parallel the UCC definition of "sale" which 
does not conclusively recognize a sale by mere title transfer. 
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934 (N.M. 1969) is also of little relevance to the Tax 
Commission's finding of two transactions. Transamerica did not 
involve a sale and leaseback agreement, but rather involved a 
sale versus lease distinction. 
II. MATRIX'S TRANSACTION IS A TRUE LEASE 
UNDER THE UCC. 
Even if this Court does not find two distinct transactions, 
a sale and a lease, this Court should still affirm the Tax 
Commission's decision since Matrix's Sale and Leaseback Agreement 
is a true lease under the UCC, not a financing arrangement. 
A. The UCC's new definition of true lease does not require 
consideration of the intent of the parties. 
Matrix has argued that its agreement is not a true lease, 
but rather a loan. Matrix has based its argument upon the 
definition of a "true lease" as contained in the UCC. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(37) (1990). Unfortunately, Matrix has 
cited case law in support of its conclusion from cases dealing 
with the prior UCC definition of lease. UCC § 1-201(37) has 
recently been modified and amended. The Utah legislature adopted 
this new definition in 1990. (Appendix E reprints both the new 
and old versions of the UCC definition). For this reason, 
reliance upon the Utah cases applying the old version of the UCC 
definition of lease should only be taken with careful 
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consideration of the 1990 amendments to that definition/ 
The most notable difference between the new UCC definition 
of lease and the prior version is the absence of the term 
"intended." The prior definition required a subjective analysis 
of whether or not the parties intended the agreement to be a 
lease. The new definition eliminates the term "intended." 
As a result, the focus is changed "from the intent of the parties 
to the economic distinctions between leases and secured 
transactions." Steven R. Schoenfeld, Commercial Law; The 
Financial Lease Under Annotated 2A of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 1989 Ann. Surv. of Am. L. 565, 574 (1989). Therefore, 
Matrix's argument that the parties to the agreement intended it 
to create a security interest is no longer relevant. Similarly, 
Matrix's reliance upon FMA for support of its intent argument is 
likewise irrelevant since FMA applied the prior UCC definition of 
a true lease. See FMA 590 P.2d 803. 
B. The UCC definition for true lease requires an objective 
analysis of the express terms of the contract. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently enumerated the proper 
steps to be followed when determining whether a transaction 
yields a true lease or a security interest. In Larson v. 
* Matrix cited the following cases which apply the old 
version of the UCC definition of true lease: FMA Financial Corp. v. 
Pro-Printers. 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979), Arnold Machinery, Co. v. 
Ball, 624 P.2d 678 (Utah 1981), Colonial Leasing Co. of New England 
v. Larson Brothers Constr., 731 P. 2d 483 (Utah 1986), and First 
Sec. Fin, v. Oakland Ltd. Inc., 750 P.2d 195 (Utah 1988). 
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Overland Thrift and Loan, 818 P.2d 1316 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) the 
court retroactively applied the new version of the UCC definition 
of lease. In applying this definition, the court noted that the 
first step is to look at the express terms of the contract: "[i]f 
the terms of an agreement are clear and unambiguous, we interpret 
them according to their plain and ordinary meaning and extrinsic 
or parol evidence is generally not admissible to explain the 
intent of the parties." Id. at 1319 (citations omitted). 
The unambiguous language of Matrix's Lease Agreement can 
only lead to the conclusion that the agreement was a true lease. 
The Lease Agreement itself is labeled "master lease agreement." 
Moreover, the document refers to Matrix as the "lessor" and the 
Customer as the "lessee." The terms of the Lease Agreement 
indicate a lease since they provide that the equipment "shall at 
all times remain the property of the Lessor or its Purchasers. 
Lessor may affix (or require the Lessee to affix) tags, decals or 
plates to the Equipment indicating Lessor's ownership, and Lessee 
shall not permit their removal or concealment." (Appendix D, R. 
95). The Lease Agreement further refers to the payments made 
under the lease as "rent payments." Given these unambiguous and 
express terms, the lease document should be construed as a true 
lease. 
In LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), the court likewise held that "the language used by the 
parties [in their contract] repeatedly manifested their intent 
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that the agreement was a lease." j[d. at 194. In reaching this 
decision, the court noted that: 
The agreement was entitled 'Preferred Vehicle Lease 
Agreement'. LMV was referred to as lessor; MCO was 
denominated lessee. Payments made under the agreement 
were called rent payments. The language of the 
agreement, i.e., the form of the agreement, would 
therefore support the conclusion that this was a 
lease. •• 
Id. at 194 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals concluded that 
these terms constituted a lease. The court further stated that 
"when the interpreting court finds no dispositive evidence that 
the parties intended the agreement to be other than what it 
purports to be by its unambiguous terms, that court should 
decline to construe the agreement contrary to those terms." Id. 
at 195. 
Since the agreement between Matrix and its Customers is 
unambiguous and the unambiguous terms denote that the agreement 
is a lease, the next step is to look at the terms of the 
agreement to see if they function as a lease or as a security 
arrangement. This step requires the application of UCC § 1-
201(37) containing the definition of a true lease. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-1-201(37) (1990). 
The UCC defines a lease transaction as a security interest 
if the agreement is not subject to termination by the lessor and 
the lease meets one of four additional criteria. The only 
additional criteria even remotely applicable to Matrix's 
situation is criteria number "IV." Under "IV", the lessee must 
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have an "option to become the owner of the goods for no 
additional consideration or nominal consideration upon compliance 
with the lease agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-
201(37)(b)(iv) (1990). Therefore, for Matrix to successfully 
argue that its lease is not a true lease under the UCC, it must 
prove that its lease agreement is not terminable and that the 
purchase option price is nominal consideration. 
Since Matrix's Lease Agreement is not terminable at the 
Lessor's discretion, the first requirement is satisfied. 
However, the Lease Agreement does not contain a purchase option 
which equates to per se nominal consideration under the UCC. 
Consideration is per se nominal under the UCC "if it is less than 
the lessee's reasonably predictable cost of performing under the 
lease agreement if the option is not exercised." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-l-201(37)(d)(ii) (1990). Here, the terms of the contract 
specifically provide that the option purchase price is either 19% 
or 46% of the amount originally paid by Matrix to the Customer. 
These amounts are not less than the Customer's cost to perform 
under the lease since the Customer will pay 19% of the amount 
originally paid by Matrix to the Customer if it chooses not to 
exercise its purchase option. Thus, Matrix has not shown that 
its lease agreement contains a per se nominal consideration 
purchase option under the UCC. 
The UCC also states that " [additional consideration is not 
nominal if . . . when the option to become the owner of the goods 
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is granted to the lessee the price is stated to be the fair 
market value of the goods determined at the time the option is to 
be performed." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-l-203(37)(d)(i) (1990) 
(emphasis added). It is impossible to determine from the facts 
available on this appeal whether the fair market value of the 
equipment is equal to the purchase option price at the time the 
purchase option is to be exercised. The option purchase price is 
stated as a percentage of the amount Matrix purchased the 
equipment from its Customer. Moreover/ the amount paid by Matrix 
to purchase the equipment is stated as a percentage of the amount 
the Customer had originally paid for the equipment. Therefore, 
before a determination can be made that the purchase option 
equates to nominal consideration, this court must consider a 
number of factors. These factors include the fair market value, 
age, and condition of the equipment at the time the Sale and 
Leaseback Agreement is entered into by Matrix and its Customer. 
Matrix has not provided this factual data.5 As such, no 
determination as to nominal consideration can be made. 
C. The Customer's purchase option is not nominal consideration 
under Utah law. 
Since it cannot be determined from the UCC whether or not 
5
 The Stipulation of Facts states that the Customer estimates 
the fair market value of the equipment to be 50% of the original 
purchase price. (Stipulation of Facts f 12, Appendix B, R. 88). 
The Tax Commission has not stipulated that this is an accurate 
estimate or that the Customer was qualified to make such an 
estimate. 
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the Customer's purchase option is for nominal consideration, this 
Court should consider other nominal consideration definitions. 
Utah Admin. R. R865-19-32S(F)(2)(b) defines nominal consideration 
as "ten percent or less of the original lease amount." If this 
definition is applied, the facts of this case conclusively show 
that the Customer's purchase option price is not nominal 
consideration. The option price is, at the very least, 19% of 
the original lease amount. The original lease amount is the 
amount Matrix paid to the Customer for the equipment. 
Utah Admin. R. R865-19-32S(F)(2)(b) is merely an adoption of 
the nominal consideration definition endorsed by the Utah Supreme 
Court in FMA. See FMA, 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979). In FMA, it was 
noted that courts had applied three tests6 to determine nominal 
consideration. Id. The court considered all three tests but 
noted that all are related and that "each can offer insight into 
the nature of the transaction . . . ." In FMA, the court focused 
on the first test since no evidence had been introduced 
concerning the projected fair market value of the equipment at 
the end of the lease. The first test required a comparison 
between the purchase option price and the original cost of the 
equipment. The Court in FMA noted that "[m]ost courts using this 
6
 The three tests are: "(1) Compare the option price with the 
original list price or cost of the property; (2) Compare the option 
price with 'sensible alternatives'; (3) Compare the option price to 
the fair market value of the property at the time the option is to 
be exercised." FMA 590 P.2d at 805-06. 
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test have concluded that a purchase option which is 10 percent or 
less of the lessor's cost is nominal." Id. at 806. This test 
was applied in FMA and is identical to the nominal consideration 
definition contained in Utah Admin. R. R865-19-32S(F)(2)(b). 
Of interest in FMA is the court's discussion of the third 
test which requires a comparison between the option price and the 
fair market value of the equipment at the time the option is to 
be exercised. This test has since been codified by the UCC and 
has been previously discussed. See the discussion of Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-l-201(37)(d)(i) (1990), supra. The court in FMA noted 
the importance of this test. However, the court pointed out that 
in FMA, "no testimony exists concerning the projected fair market 
value of the equipment at the end of the lease." Id. at 806. 
Without this information, the court concluded that it could not 
apply the fair market value test, but was required to apply the 
10 percent or less rule as conclusive evidence of nominal 
consideration. Id. 
This Court is faced with the same circumstances as was the 
court in FMA. Heref there is no evidence of the fair market 
value of the equipment at the time the purchase option is to be 
exercised. As such, this Court should apply the 10 percent or 
less test for nominal consideration and conclude that the 
purchase option is not nominal consideration. If the Customer's 
purchase option price is not nominal consideration, then 
application of the UCC definition for a true lease leads to the 
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conclusion that Matrix's proposed Sale and Leaseback Agreement is 
indeed a true lease, not a financing arrangement. This Court 
should make this decision accordingly and affirm the Tax 
Commission's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The Sale and Leaseback agreement between Matrix and the 
Customer contemplates two separate transactions. The first 
transaction is the sale of the equipment to Matrix. The contract 
specifically transfers title to the equipment to Matrix in 
connection with this sale. Transfer of title is conclusive 
evidence of a sale under the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act. The 
second transaction is the lease of this equipment back to the 
Customer, a transaction which is subject to sales tax whether 
treated as a true lease or a financing arrangement. 
Even if the Sale and Leaseback Agreement was deemed to 
contemplate a single transaction, the lease of the equipment back 
to the Customer is not a financing arrangement under the UCC 
definition of true lease since the Customer's purchase option 
price does not constitute nominal consideration. As a true 
lease, the lease is subject to sales tax. 
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Under either approach, Matrix's proposed Sale and Leaseback 
Agreement is subject to sales tax. For this reasons, the Tax 
Commission's decision should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^ day of July, 1993. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above 
Brief of Respondent was mailed, postage pre-paid on this <£j%j_ 
, 1993 to the following: 
Craig C. Mortensen 
6925 Union Park Center, #250 





BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
MATRIX FUNDING CORP., ) 
Petitioner, j DECLARATORY ORDER 
v. ) 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE ) Appeal No. 91-1304 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, : 
) T£x Type: Sales & Use 
Respondent. : 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for 
a formal hearing on the Petitioner's Request for Declaratory 
Judgment on September l, 1992, from an advisory opinion issued by 
the Commission on July 11, 1992. Paul F. Iwasaki, Presiding 
Officer, heard the matter for and on behalf of the Commission. 
Present and representing the Petitioner was Craig Mortensen, Esq. 
Present and representing the Respondent was Mark Wainwright, 
Assistant Utah Attorney General. 
Based upon the facts as stipulated to by the parties, 
briefs, oral arguments of counsel for the respective parties, the 
Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is sales tax. 
2. The Petitioner provides funding for commercial 
transactions. In the instant case, the Petitioner seeks a 
declaratory order concerning the sales tax status of a proposed 
lease-back transaction. 
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3. In the proposed transaction, the Petitioner would 
purchase from and lease back to its customer approximately 4,500 
non-inventory items of furniture, equipment and other depreciable 
personal property owned by the customer. 
4. Under the terms of the agreement, the Petitioner's 
customer would repay the amount loaned in 60 monthly payments plus 
a final fixed guaranteed amount. If during the first 12 months of 
the agreement the consumer price index increases, the monthly 
payment would correspondingly increase. The repayment agreement is 
structured so that the Petitioner will receive the principal amount 
loaned plus a commercially common interest rate. 
5. The terms of the sale and lease back agreement 
between the Petitioner and its customer are contained in a Sale and 
Lease Back Agreement, as well as a Master Lease Agreement and an 
Equipment Schedule. 
6. Under the terms of the agreement, title to the 
property passes from the customer to the Petitioner and the 
equipment at all times thereafter remains the property of the 
Petitioner. 
7. The purpose for entering into the lease back and 
financing agreement is to provide the Petitioner's customer with 
additional operating capital by pledging the furniture and 
equipment as collateral. 
8. For sales tax purposes, the Petitioner argues that 
the transaction should be characterized as a secured loan rather 
than a sale and lease-back arrangement. 
-2-
Appeal No. 91-1304 
9. In support of its argument, the Petitioner argues 
that under federal income tax law they would be required to treat 
such a transaction as a loan. Therefore, the Petitioner would not 
be able to take depreciation deductions for the equipment and the 
lessee would not be able to deduct the loan payments as a business 
expense. 
10. By entering into this kind of arrangement, the 
Petitioner's customers, under Financial Accounting Standards 
Board's Statement Number 13, would be able to characterize the 
transaction as an "operating lease" for financial accounting and 
reporting purposes. Under such a provision, the Petitioner's 
customer would not be required to report the debt in their 
financial statements. The Petitioner argues however, that in spite 
of this characterization as a "operating lease" the intention of it 
and its customers is to create a secured loan transaction and not 
a lease as is used in the traditional sense of that term. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
There is levied a sales and use tax on the purchaser for 
the amount paid or charged for leases and rentals of tangible 
personal property if the property site is in the state, if the 
lessee took possession in this state, or if the property stored, 
used, or otherwise consumed in this state. (Utah Code Ann. §59-12-
103(1) (k). 
DECISION AND ORDER 
In the present case, the issue before the Commission is 
whether the transaction between the Petitioner and its customers 
-3-
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constitutes a lease within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §59-12-
103(l)(k), or whether the transaction constitutes a secured 
interest loan which would not be subject to sales and use tax. 
In support of its position, the Petitioner argues that 
the intent of it and its customers in entering the transaction is 
to create a secured interest loan and not a lease. Further the 
Petitioner argues that it does not receive any benefits of 
ownership. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that it cannot sell 
the property at fair market value but must sell it at a set price. 
The Petitioner also argues that it has no burdens of ownership 
since the customer is responsible for payment of all property tax, 
repairs, and maintenance. Additionally, the Petitioner notes that 
the customer retains possession to the property. 
Under the facts of the present case, the Tax Commission 
finds that the transaction entered into by the Petitioner with its 
customers is a sale and lease back arrangement which is subject to 
sales and use tax as provided for by Utah Code Ann. §59-12-
103(1) (k) . Of primary importance in arriving at this determination 
is the fact that by the specific terms of the agreements, title to 
the equipment passes to the Petitioner and thereafter the equipment 
remains the property of the Petitioner unless and until its 
customer makes all necessary payments and exercises its option to 
purchase the equipment. 
The Commission acknowledges the fact that the intention 
of the parties may be to create a financing arrangement rather than 
a lease arrangement and this arrangement is fashioned the way that 
-4-
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it is only because of certain accounting considerations. 
Nevertheless, the express terms of the agreements governing the 
transaction specifically create a taxable transaction and it is 
those written agreements which will govern. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds the 
sale and lease back arrangement proposed by the Petitioner to be a 
transaction subject to sales and use tax as provided for by Utah 
Code Ann. §59-12-103(1)(k). It is so ordered. 
DATED this //'fV day of ^^WW^ 1992. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
Hansen 
Chairman 
Roger 0. Tew 
Commissioner 
J6e B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
IMMI/MU 
S. Blaine Willes 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a petition 
for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13TD r^6^-46b-
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
Matrix Funding Corporation 
c/o Craig C. Mortensen 
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Craig Sandberg 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
MATRIX FUNDING CORPORATION, ] 
a Utah corporation 
Petitioner, 
V • 
AUDITING DIVISION, UTAH STATE 
TAX COMMISSION, ] 
Respondent. ] 
REVISED | STIPULATION OF FACTS 
) Appeal No. 91-1304 
i Tax Type: Sales & Use 
The parties hereby stipulate that, for the purpose of this 
case, the following statements may be accepted as true, except as 
qualified herein, and all exhibits referred to herein and attached 
hereto, are incorporated in this stipulation and made a part 
hereof. Either party may introduce other and further evidence not 
inconsistent with the facts herein stipulated or the contents of 
the exhibits. In addition, the parties have stipulated as to the 
issues to be determined by the Utah State Tax Commission 
("Commission"). 
1. Matrix and its Utah customer ("Customer") will enter into 
a Sale and Leaseback Agreement ("Leaseback Agreement", Exhibit "A") 
vhich provides that Customer will sell to and leaseback from Matrix 
approximately 4,500 separate non-inventory items of furniture, 
equipment and other depreciable personal property ("furniture and 
equipment") presently owned by Customer and used in its business 
operations. The amount Matrix will pay to Customer for the 
furniture and equipment is approximately 72% of the original 
purchase price paid by Customer. The furniture and equipment 
subject to this transaction represent a substantial portion of the 
furniture and equipment owned and used by Customer in its business 
operations. 
2. The terms of the leaseback are contained in a Master 
Lease Agreement ("Master Agreement", Exhibit "B") and accompanying 
Equipment Schedule ("Schedule", Exhibit "C"). The Master Agreement 
and Schedule are referred to herein collectively as the "Financing 
Agreement". In connection with the Financing Agreement, Matrix and 
Customer will execute and file a UCC-1 financing statement with the 
State of Utah to perfect Matrix's alleged security interest in the 
furniture and equipment. 
3. Customer is a retailer of goods generally of a type 
different from the furniture and equipment. 
4. Customer paid Utah sales and/or use tax on the furniture 
and equipment at the time it was originally purchased. 
5. Customer's business purpose in entering into the 
Leaseback Agreement and Financing Agreement is to obtain additional 
operating capital through a loan by pledging the furniture and 
equipment as collateral. 
6. Customer desires to characterize the transaction as an 
"operating lease" for financial accounting and reporting purposes. 
An "operating lease" is a term defined by Financial Accounting 
Standards Board Statement No. 13 ("FASB 13"), a pronouncement which 
contains rules governing the reporting of leases by Certified 
Public Accountants in audited financial statements. FASB 13 
provides that the user of personal property under an "operating 
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lease" is not required to report the obligation to make future 
lease payments as a liability on its audited financial statements• 
7. The Financing Agreement provides that Customer will be 
required to make 60 base monthly payments, each in the same fixed 
amount ("base payments"). If, during the first 12 months of the 
lease, there occurs any increase in the Consumer Price Index 
("CPI") over the CPI in effect for the month immediately before 
such 12 month period, each base payment will increase, starting 
with the 13th payment and continuing through the 60th payment, to 
an amount equal to 128% of the base monthly payment ("contingent 
payment"). At the end of the 60 month lease term, Customer shall 
have an option to purchase all, but not less than all, of the 
equipment for one of the following amounts: (a) In the event 
contingent payments were not made, the option price will be 4 6% of 
the original amount Matrix paid to Customer for the furniture and 
equipment ("base purchase option price"); and (b) In the event 
contingent payments were made, the option price will be 19% of the 
original amount Matrix paid to Customer for the furniture and 
equipment ("contingent purchase option price"). If, at the end of 
the 60 month lease term, Customer decides to return the furniture 
and equipment to Matrix, it is required to pay to Matrix an 
additional amount equal to 19% of the original amount Matrix paid 
to Customer for the furniture and equipment. Since 1954, the CPI 
has always increased at some point during any 12 month period over 
the CPI in effect for the month just prior to the start of such 12 
month period (See Exhibit "D" attached). 
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8. Matrix's receipt of either (a) the 60 monthly base 
payments and the "base purchase option price" or (b) the first 12 
monthly base payments, the next 48 monthly contingent payments and 
the "contingent purchase option price", will return to Matrix the 
original amount paid to Customer plus interest at a commercially 
reasonable rate. 
9. Matrix and Customer believe that the use of contingent 
payments as provided in the Schedule will qualify the Lease as an 
"operating lease" under FASB 13. Were it not for Customer's desire 
to classify the transaction as an "operating lease" under FASB 13, 
the parties would have structured the transaction as a traditional 
loan with a promissory note and security agreement. 
10. Matrix and Customer intend that Customer shall be 
entitled to the benefits of legal and beneficial ownership of the 
furniture and equipment during the entire transaction. 
11. Customer will continue to depreciate the furniture and 
equipment in accordance with its previously established methods and 
will consider itself the owner for federal and state income tax 
purposes. Matrix will not claim depreciation on the furniture and 
equipment or consider itself the owner for federal and state income 
tax purposes. Both parties will treat the transaction as an 
interest bearing loan for federal and state income tax purposes. 
12. Customer has determined it will need the furniture and 
equipment for its business operations for a period of at least 10 
to 13 years from the date the Financing Agreement is entered into 
with Matrix. At the end of the transaction after 60 months, 
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Customer estimates the furniture and equipment will have a fair 
market value equal to 50% of the original amount Matrix paid to 
Customer. Given the payment terms under the Financing Agreement, 
the furniture and equipment's fair market value after 60 months and 
the high replacement costs for similar furniture and equipment, 
Customer has concluded it would not be economically feasible for it 
to return the furniture and equipment to Matrix at the end of the 
60 month payment period. It is Customer's intent to exercise one 
of the two purchase options at the end of the 60 month lease term 
and retain all of the furniture and equipment for use in its 
business operations for the duration of its economic life which 
Customer estimates to be 10 to 13 years from the date of the 
Financing Agreement. 
13. The furniture and equipment will at all times remain in 
possession of Customer at its current Utah location and will 
continue to be used by customer in the same manner after the 
Financing Agreement is in place. Matrix will never take possession 
of the furniture and equipment, except pursuant to its remedies 
under the Financing Agreement in the event of a Customer payment 
default. 
14. Under the Financing Agreement, Customer will be liable 
for and obligated to pay all costs and expenses in connection with 
the ownership, possession and use of the furniture and equipment, 
including but not limited to, license fees, assessments, property 
taxes, insurance and maintenance. Customer will assume all risk of 
loss with respect to the equipment. Customer will not look to 
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Matrix for any breach of warranties concerning the condition of the 
furniture and equipment. 
15. Matrix has no use for and is not interested in purchasing 
the furniture and equipment other than to permit Customer to 
possess and use it under the terms of the Financing Agreement. 
Matrix does not have the capacity to absorb and use any portion of 
the furniture and equipment for its internal purposes. 
Following are the issues presented to the Commission for 
determination: 
1. Is the transaction a "financing" arrangement or is the 
transaction a true sale followed by a leaseback? 
2. Does Matrix have a "security interest" or does Matrix 
have an "ownership" interest in the furniture and equipment? 
3. Are any of the payments made by Matrix to Customer or by 
Customer to Matrix under the transaction subject.to Utah sales or 
use tax? 
Dated as of May 19# 1992. 
\/ . y* . . , i 
Craig C. Mortensen 
Counsellor: 
Matrix Funding Corporation 
Petitioner 
1 - , 
Mark Wainwright ^ 
Counsel for: ^ 
Auditing Division, 





SAUE AND LEASEBACK AGREEMENT 
This Sale and Leaseback Agreement ("Agreement*) is dated and effective this day 
of , 1992, by and between ("Seller") and MATRIX FUNDING CORPORATION, 
6925 Union Park Center, #250, Midvale, Utah 84047 ("Buyer"). 
WHEREAS, Buyer is purchasing equipment ("Equipment") from Seller and Seller desires to 
use the Equipment under the terms and conditions of Master Lease Agreement, dated and effective 
as of ("Lease Agreement"): 
THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises herein, Seller and Buyer agree as 
follows: 
1. Sale and Leaseback. Buyer agrees to purchase the Equipment set forth in each 
Equipment Schedule to the Lease Agreement and to lease the Equipment to the Seller pursuant to 
the terms and conditions contained in the Lease Agreement and Equipment Schedule. 
2. Purchase Price and Payment Buyer and Seller agree that the purchase price of the 
Equipment is S , which shall be payable to Seller on the Closing Date which is set for 
, or such later date as the parties shall mutually agree to in writing. 
3. Title. The parties agree that title to the Equipment shall pass from Seller to Buyer 
on the Closing Date. 
4. Buyers Purchase and Performance. Seller agrees that Buyer's obligations hereunder 
are expressly subject to the following conditions: 
a. Buyer's receipt of the executed Lease Agreement, the Equipment Schedule, and 
UCC-1 financing statement(s). 
b. Buyer's receipt of Corporate resolutions or incumbency certificates in form 
satisfactory to Buyer authorizing Seller's entry into this sale and leaseback transaction 
with Buyer. 
5. Seller's Representations and Warranties. Seller represents and warrants to Buyer that: 
a. Seller is a corporation duly organized, validly existing and in good standing under the 
laws of the State of Utah and in all jurisdictions where such qualification is required 
for it to conduct its business. 
b. Seller has all requisite power and authority to conduct its business, to own and lease 
its properties and to enter into and perform all of its obligations under this 
Agreement. 
c. This Agreement has been duly authorized by Seller and constitutes the valid, legal and 
binding obligation of Seller enforceable in accordance with its terms. 
d. No event has occurred or is continuing which constitutes an event of default under 
this Agreement There is no action, suit or proceeding pending or threatened against 
or effecting Seller before or by any court, administrative agency or other 
governmental authority which brings into question the validity of the transaction 
contemplated by this Agreement or which might materially impair the ability of Seller 
to perform its obligations under this Agreement or the transaction contemplated 
hereby. 
c Neither the execution and delivery by the Seller of this Agreement, nor the 
compliance by the Seller with the provisions of any thereof, conflicts with or results 
in a breach of any of the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation, or By-Laws of 
Seller, or of any applicable law, judgment, order, writ, injunction, decree, rule or 
regulation of any court, administrative agency or other governmental authority, or of 
any agreement or other instrument to'-which the Seller is a party or by which it is 
bound, or constitutes or will constitute a default under any thereof. 
f. The transaction contemplated by this Agreement complies with all applicable federal 
and state laws, rules and regulations. 
g. No consent, approval or authorization of or by any court, administrative agency or 
other governmental authority is required in connection with the execution, delivery 
or performance by Seller of, or the consummation by Seller of the transaction 
contemplated by this Agreement 
h. Seller is transferring to Buyer good title to the Equipment, free and clear of all liens 
and encumbrances of any kind or description. 
7. Manufacturer's Warranties. In the event Seller does not exercise its option to 
purchase the Equipment from Buyer upon termination of the Lease, Seller agrees to assign to Buyer, 
to the extent assignable, all manufacturer and vendor warranties and indemnities with respect to the 
Equipment 
8. Successors. Buyer and Seller agree that this Agreement shall inure to the benefit of 
and shall be binding upon Seller and Buyer, their respective successors and assigns. Any assignment 
by Buyer shall not require Seller's prior written approval provided such assignee agrees to observe 
Lessor's covenant of quiet enjoyment under the Lease. Seller shall not assign any interest in this 
Agreement without Buyer's prior written consent 
9. Survival of Covenants. Buyer and Seller agree that the warranties, covenants and 
agreements contained in this Agreement shall survive the passing of title to the Equipment 
10. limitations. Buyer or its respective successors and assigns, shall not be liable for any 
indirect, special or consequential damages, in connection with or arising by reason of this Agreement; 
nor shall Buyer, or its respective successors and assigns, be liable for any event beyond its control. 
11. Miscellaneous. Section titles are not intended to, and shall not limit or otherwise affect 
the interpretation of this Agreement If any provision of this Agreement shall be held to be invalid 
or unenforceable, the validity and enforceability of the remaining provisions hereof shall not be 
affected or impaired in any way. Any modifications to this Agreement shall be in writing and shall 
be signed by both parties and their last known assignees, if any. Any terms capitalized herein shall 
have the meanings set forth in the Lease Agreement and Equipment Schedule, which are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
12. Entire Agreement Seller and Buyer agree that this Agreement, the Equipment 
Schedule and the Lease Agreement shall constitute the entire Agreement and supersede all 
proposals, oral or written, all prior negotiations and all other communications between them with 
respect to the Equipment 
13. Legal and Administrative Expenses. Each party shall be responsible for its own legal 
and administrative expenses incurred in connection with this sale/leaseback transaction. 
14. No Brokers Fee. Each party represents it has retained no brokers in this transaction 
and indemniCes the other party against any brokers' or other fees which might result from the 
indemnifying party's actions. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be duly executed on 
the date set forth below by their authorized representatives. 






M A T R I X 
F U N D I N G C O R P O R A T I O N 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 250 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
MASTER LEASE AGREEMENT 
This Agreement is made this day of ,1992, between MATRIX FUNDING 
CORPORATION, with its principal office at 6925 Union Park Center, Suite 250, Midvale, Utah 
84047 (the "Lessor"), and with its principal office at (the 
"Lessee"). 
L LEASE: 
Lessor agrees to lease to Lessee, and Lessee agrees to lease from Lessor, the Equipment (the 
"Equipment") described in any Equipment Schedule executed and delivered by Lessor and Lessee 
concurrently with this Agreement or subsequent thereto. Neither Lessor nor Lessee shall have any 
obUgations hereunder until the execution and delivery of the first such Equipment Schedule. The 
terms and conditions contained herein (including any Supplement or Rider annexed hereto) and in 
said Equipment Schedule shall govern the leasing and use of the Equipment 
2. ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS: 
(a) The Installation Date" means, as to the Equipment designated on any Equipment 
Schedule, the earlier to occur of (a) the date specified as the Installation Date in the applicable 
Equipment Schedule, (b) the date Lessee accepts the Equipment as set forth in the Certificate of 
Installation signed by the Lessee, or (c) the date which is determined by the manufacturer or vendor 
of the Equipment to be the date of installation of such Equipment 
(b) The "Commencement Date" means, as to the Equipment designated on any Equipment 
Schedule, where the Installation Date for such Equipment Schedule falls on the first day of the 
month, that date, and, in any other case, the first day of the month following the month in which such 
Installation Date falls. 
3. TERM OF LEASE: 
The term of this Agreement, as to aU Equipment designated on any Equipment 
Schedule, shall commence on the Installation Date for such Equipment, and shall continue for an 
initial period ending that number of months from the applicable Commencement Date as is specified 
on such Equipment Schedule (the "Initial Period"). 
4. RENT AND PAYMENT: 
As to all Equipment leased hereunder, the Monthly Rental payable by Lessee to Lessor shall 
be as set forth in the applicable Equipment Schedule. The Monthly Rental shall begin on the 
Installation Date and shall be due and payable by Lessee in arrears on the last day of each month 
through the end of the Initial Period If the Installation Date does not fall on the first day of a 
month, the first payment shall be a pro rata portion of the Monthly Rental, calculated on a 30-day 
basis, and shall be due and payable on the Installation Date. 
Late charges on any past due payments shall accrue at the rate of 1 1/2% per month, or if 
such rate shall exceed the maximum rate allowed by law, then at such maximum rate, and shall be 
payable on demand, or, if late charges are levied by a lending institution due to any late payment, 
Lessee agrees to be responsible for payment of such late charges. Lessee agrees to make payment 
for any late charges promptly upon demand by Lessor. 
5. TAXES: 
Lessee shall pay to Lessor an amount equal to all taxes paid, payable or required to be 
collected by Lessor, however designated, which are levied or based on the Monthly Rental or on the 
possession, use, operation, control or value of the Equipment, including, without limitation, state and 
local privilege or excise taxes, sales and use taxes, property taxes, and taxes or charges based on gross 
revenue, but excluding taxes based on Lessor's net income. Lessor shall invoice Lessee for all such 
taxes in advance of their payment due date, and Lessee shall promptly remit to Lessor all such taxes 
and charges upon receipt of such invoice from Lessor. Lessee agrees to pay all penalties and interest 
resulting from its failure to timely remit such taxes to Lessor. Charges for penalties and interest shall 
be promptly paid by Lessee when invoiced by Lessor. Lessor agrees to file all required sales and use 
tax and property tax returns and reports concerning the Equipment with all applicable governmental 
agencies. 
6. SHIPPING, DELIVERY AND ACCEPTANCE: 
(a) Lessor shall use its best efforts to ship on or before the estimated shipping date 
specified in any purchase order delivered to Lessor or vendor of the Equipment Lessor shall not 
be liable for any delay or failure to deliver resulting from circumstances which are beyond Lessor's 
control. 
(b) Delivery shall be FOB point of shipment In the absence of specific written 
instruction from Lessee, Lessor or its supplier wOI select a carrier, but Lessor shall have no liability 
in connection with shipment Risk or loss shall pass to Lessee upon delivery to the carrier and 
Lessee shall be responsible all in transit insurance. 
(c) Lessee shall be responsible for preparation of the installation site and for receipt of 
and installation of the Equipment upon delivery. Lessee will provide the required suitable electric 
current to operate the Equipment Lessee may separately contract with a manufacturer approved 
installer to install the Equipment at the location indicated in the Equipment Schedule. 
7. USE; ALTERATIONS AND ATTACHMENTS: 
(a) Lessee shall be entitled to unlimited usage of the Equipment during the Initial Period 
and any extension or renewal periods. 
(b) Lessee will at all times keep the Equipment in its sole possession and control. The 
Equipment shall not be moved from the locations stated in the Equipment Schedule without the prior 
written consent of Lessor. 
(c) Lessee may not make alterations in or add attachments to the Equipment without Srst 
obtaining the written consent of Lessor. Any such alternations or attachments shall be made at 
Lessee's expense and shaD not interfere with the normal and satisfactory operation or maintenance 
of the Equipment The manufacturer may incorporate engineering changes or make temporary 
alterations to the Equipment upon request of Lessee. Unless Lessor shall otherwise agree in writing, 
all such alternations and attachments shall be and become the property of Lessor or, at the option 
of Lessor, shall be removed by Lessee at the termination of the applicable Lease and the Equipment 
restored at Lessee's expense to its original condition, reasonable wear and tear only excepted. 
8. MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS: 
(a) Lessee shall, during the continuance of this Agreement, at its expense, keep the 
Equipment in good working order -and condition and make all necessary adjustments, repairs and 
replacements and shall not use or permit the Equipment to be used for any purpose for which, in the 
opinion of the manufacturer, the Equipment is not designed or reasonably suitable. 
(b) Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, Lessee may, during the continuance 
of this Agreement, at its own expense, enter into and maintain in force a contract with the 
manufacturer or other qualified maintenance organization for maintenance of each item of 
Equipment. Such contract as to each item may commence upon expiration of the manufacturer's 
warranty period, if any, relating to such item. Lessee shall furnish Lessor with a copy of such 
contract, if any, upon demand. 
(c) At the termination of an Equipment Schedule, Lessee shall, at its expense, return the 
Equipment listed thereon to Lessor (at the location designated by Lessor within the Continental 
United States) in the same operating order, repair, condition and appearance as on the Installation 
Date, reasonable wear and tear only excepted with all engineering changes prescribed by the 
manufacturer prior thereto incorporated therein, and Lessee shall arrange and pay for such repairs 
as are necessary for the manufacturer or qualified maintenance organization to accept the Equipment 
under contract maintenance at its then standard rates. 
9. OWNERSHIP AND INSPECTION: 
(a) The Equipment shall at all times remain the property of the Lessor or its purchasers. 
Lessor may affix (or require Lessee to affix) tags, decals or plates to the Equipment indicating 
Lessor's ownership, and Lessee shall not permit their removal or concealment 
(b) Lessee shall keep the Equipment free and clear of all liens and encumbrances except 
those permitted by Lessor or its assigns. 
(c) Lessor, its assigns and their agents shall have free access to the Equipment at all 
reasonable times during normal business hours for the purpose of inspecting the Equipment and for 
any other purpose contemplated in this Agreement 
(d) Lessee shall immediately notify Lessor in writing of all details concerning any damage 
or loss to the Equipment arising from the alleged or apparent improper manufacture, functioning or 
operation of the Equipment 
10. WARRANTIES: 
(a) LESSEE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT IT HAS SELECTED THE EQUIPMENT 
ITSELF, AND THAT LESSOR HAS NOT MADE ANY REPRESENTATIONS OR 
WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WITH RESPECT TO THE 
DESCRIPTION, CONDITION OR PERFORMANCE OF THE EQUIPMENT, ITS 
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR WITH RESPECT 
TO PATENT INFRINGEMENT OR THE LIKE, AND LESSOR EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ALL 
SUCH WARRANTIES. LESSOR SHALL HAVE NO LIABILITY TO LESSEE FOR ANY 
CLAIM, LOSS OR DAMAGE OF ANY KIND OR NATURE WHATSOEVER, INCLUDING 
SPECIAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES. 
(b) Provided no Event of Default exists, Lessor assigns to Lessee all assignable warranties 
on the Equipment during the Initial Period. 
11. NET LEASE; OBLIGATIONS ABSOLUTE AND UNCONDITIONAL: 
Lessee agrees that this is a net lease, and that, as between Lessor and Lessee, Lessee shall 
be responsible for all costs and expenses of every nature whatsoever arising out of or in connection 
with or related to this Agreement or the Equipment (such as, but not limited to, transportation in 
and out, rigging, drayage, packing, installation and deinstallation charges). 
Lessee further agrees that its Monthly Rental and other obligations hereunder shall be 
absolute and unconditional and shall not be subject to any abatement, reduction, recoupment, 
defense, ofiEset or counterclaim avaflable to Lessee against Lessor, nor, except as otherwise expressly 
provided herein or as agreed to by Lessor in writing, shall this Agreement terminate for any reason 
whatsoever prior to the end of the Initial Period. 
12. ASSIGNMENT: 
Lessee shall not assign this Agreement or any of its rights hereunder or sublease the 
Equipment without the prior written consent of Lessor, except that Lessee may assign this Agreement 
or sublease the Equipment to any parent or subsidiary corporation, or to a corporation which shall 
have acquired all or substantially all of the property of Lessee by merger, consolidation or purchase. 
No permitted assignment or sublease shall relieve Lessee of any of its obligations hereunder. 
Lessor shall be entitled to assign this Agreement or any Equipment Schedule hereunder, 
either outright or as collateral security for loans made, and upon receipt of notice of any such 
assignment and instructions from Lessor, Lessee shall pay its rental and other obligations hereunder 
to the third party (or to another party designated by the third party), and Lessee's obligations to such 
assignee hereunder shall be absolute and unconditional 
Notwithstanding any assignment, neither the assignee nor any of its assignees shall be deemed 
to have assumed or be obligated to perform any of the obligations of Lessor. 
13. RISK OF LOSS ON LESSEE: 
Until the Equipment is returned to Lessor as provided in this Agreement, Lessee shall bear 
all risk of loss, damage or destruction to the Equipment, howsoever caused If any item of 
Equipment is rendered unusable as a result of any physical damage to or destruction of the 
Equipment, Lessee shall give to Lessor immediate notice thereof and this Agreement as to such item 
shall continue in full force and effect without any abatement of any rental. Lessee shall determine, 
within fifteen (15) days after the date of occurrence of such damage or destruction, whether such 
item of Equipment can be repaired In the event Lessee determines that such item of Equipment 
can be repaired, Lessee shall cause such item of Equipment to be promptly repaired. In the event 
Lessee determines that the item of Equipment cannot be repaired, Lessee at its expense shall 
promptly replace such item of Equipment and convey title to such replacement to Lessor free and 
clear of all liens and encumbrances, and this Lease shall continue in hill force and effect as though 
such damage or destruction had not occurred All proceeds of insurance received by Lessor or 
Lessee under any insurance policy shall be applied toward the cost of any such repair or replacement. 
14. INSURANCE: 
During the continuance of this Agreement as to each Equipment Schedule, Lessee shall, at 
its own expense, keep in effect (a) an all risk casualty insurance policy covering the Equipment 
designated in such Schedule for not less than its replacement cost and designating Lessor and its 
assigns as additional loss payees, and (b) a public liability policy in amounts acceptable to Lessor and 
designating Lessor and its assigns as co-insureds. Such insurance shall be written by licensed 
insurance companies acceptable to Lessor. Certificates or other evidence of such insurance coverage 
shall be furnished to Lessor upon demand. Each written policy shall provide that no less than thirty 
days written notice shall be given Lessor prior to cancellation of such policy for any reason. Lessee 
shall be responsible for any deductibles on such policies. 
15. INDEMNIHCATION: 
Except for the gross negligence or willful misconduct of Lessor or as otherwise provided 
herein, Lessee agrees to indemnify Lessor against and hold Lessor harmless of any and all claims, 
(INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, CLAIMS INVOLVING STRICT OR ABSOLUTE 
LIABILITY), actions, suits, proceedings, costs, expenses, damages and liabilities at law or in equity, 
including .:torney's fees, arising out of, connected with or resulting from this Lease or the 
Equipment including, without limitation the delivery, possession, use, operation, condition, lease, 
return, storage or disposition thereof. For purpose of this Paragraph, the term "Lessor" shall include 
lessor, its successors and assigns, shareholders, directors, officers, representatives and agents, and the 
provisions of this Paragraph shall survive expiration of this Lease with respect to events occurring 
prior thereto. 
16. EVENTS OF DEFAULT AND REMEDIES: 
The occurrence of any one or more of the following events (each an "Event of Default") shall 
constitute a default of this Agreement: 
(a) Lessee fails to pay any Monthly Rental when the same becomes due and such failure 
shall continue uncured for ten (10) days after written notice thereof is given to Lessee. 
(b) Lessee attempts to remove, sell, transfer, encumber, sublet or part with possession of 
the Equipment or any items thereof, except as expressly permitted herein. 
(c) Lessee shall fail to observe or perform any of the other obligations required to be 
observed or performed by Lessee hereunder and such failure shall continue uncured for ten (10) days 
after written notice thereof is given to Lessee. 
(d) Lessee's representations and warranties made in this Agreement or in connection 
herewith shall be false or misleading in any material respect 
(e) Lessee ceases doing business as a going concern, makes an assignment for the benefit 
of creditors, admits in writing its inability to pay its financial obligations as they become due, files a 
voluntary petition in bankruptcy, is adjudicated a bankrupt or an insolvent, files a petition seeking 
for itself any reorganization, arrangement, composition, readjustment, liquidation, dissolution or 
similar arrangement under any present or future statute, law or regulation or files an answer admitting 
the material allegations of a petition filed against it in any such proceeding, consents to or acquiesces 
in the appointment of a trustee, receiver or liquidator of it or of all or any substantial part of its 
assets or properties, or if it or its shareholders shall take any action looking to its dissolution or 
liquidation. 
(f) Within 30 days after the commencement of any proceedings against Lessee seeking 
reorganization, arrangement, readjustment, liquidation, dissolution or similar relief under any present 
or future statute, law or regulation, such proceedings shall not have been dismissed, or if within 30 
days after the appointment without Lessee's consent or acquiescence of any trustee, receiver or 
liquidator of it or of all or any substantial part of its assets and properties, such appointment shall 
not be vacated. 
Upon the occurrence of an Event of Default, Lessor may at its option do any or all of the 
following: (i) enforce this Agreement according to its terms; (ii) by notice to Lessee terminate this 
Lease as to any or all Equipment Schedules; (iii) whether or not this Lease is terminated as to any 
or all Equipment Schedules, take possession of any or all of the Equipment listed on any or all 
Equipment Schedules, wherever situated, and for such purpose, Lessor may enter upon any Lessee's 
premises without liability for so doing or, Lessor may cause Lessee, and Lessee hereby agrees, to 
return the Equipment to Lessor as provided in the Lease; (iv) recover from Lessee, as liquidated 
damages for loss of a bargain and not as a penalty, an amount equal to the present value of (A) all 
future Monthly Rentals to be paid by Lessee during the remainder of the Initial Period and (B) the 
amount, if any, set forth in the Equipment Schedule which Lessee is required to pay to Lessor upon 
return of the Equipment, discounted at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum, which present 
value amount shall become immediately due and payable; and (v) sell, dispose of, hold, use or lease 
any Equipment as Lessor in its sole discretion may determine without any duty, except as provided 
below, to account to Lessee (and Lessor shall not be obligated to give preference to the sale, lease 
or other disposition of the Equipment over the sale, lease or other disposition of similar equipment 
owned or leased by or through Lessor). 
In the event Lessee shall have paid to Lessor all liquidated damages referred to in clause (iv) 
above, Lessor hereby agrees to pay to Lessee, promptly after receipt thereof, all rentals or proceeds 
received from (a) the reletting of the Equipment during the remainder of the Initial Term or 
successive period then in effect (after deduction of an amount equal to all Lessor's Damages defined 
below) or (b) any sale of the Equipment occurring during the remainder of the Initial Term or 
successive period then in effect less an amount equal to the estimated fair market value of the 
Equipment at the end of the Initial Term or successive period then in effect (after deduction of an 
amount equal to all Lessor's Damages defined below), said amount never to exceed the amount of 
the liquidated damages paid by Lessee. Any remaining amounts from reletting or sale shall be 
retained by Lessor. Lessee shall in any event remain fully liable for all sums due and payable for all 
periods up to and including the date on which Lessor has declared this Lease to be in default, and 
for all reasonable damages as provided by law, and for all costs and expenses incurred by Lessor on 
account of such default including, but not limited to, all court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees 
(collectively, "Lessor's Damages"). Lessee further agrees that, in any event, it will be liable for any 
defidency after any sale, lease or other disposition by Lessor. The rights and remedies afforded 
Lessor hereunder shall not be deemed to be exclusive, but shall be in addition to any rights or 
remedies provided by law. 
17. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTEES: 
(a) Lessee represents and warrants as follows: 
(1) Lessee is a corporation, duly organized, validly existing and in good standing 
under the laws of the state of its incorporation and in all jurisdictions where 
the leased equipment will be located or operated under the Agreements. 
(2) Lessee has all requisite power and authority to conduct its business, to own 
and lease its properties and to enter into and perform all of its obligations 
under the Agreements. 
(3) This Agreement has been duly authorized by Lessee and constitutes the valid, 
legal and binding obligation of Lessee and is enforceable in accordance with 
its terms. 
(4) No event has occurred or is continuing which constitutes an event of default 
under the Agreement. There is no action, suit, order or proceeding pending 
or threatened against or affecting Lessee before or by any court, 
administrative agency or other governmental authority which brings into 
question the validity of the transaction contemplated by the Agreements or 
which might materially impair the ability of Lessee to perform its obligations 
under the Agreement 
(5) Neither the execution and delivery by Lessee of the Agreement, nor the 
compliance by Lessee with the provisions hereof, conflicts with or results in 
a breach of the provisions of the Articles , f Incorporation, or bylaws of 
Lessee, or any applicable law, judgment, ore r, writ, injunction, decree, rule 
or regulation of any court, administrative agency or other governmentati 
authority, or of any agreement or other instrument to which Lessee is bound, 
or constitutes or will constitute a default under any thereof. 
(b) Lessor represents and warrants as follows: 
(1) Lessor is a corporation duly organized, validly existing and in good standing 
under the laws of its state of incorporation and in all jurisdictions where such 
qualification is required for it to conduct its business. 
(2) Lessor has all requisite power and authority to conduct its business, to own 
and lease its properties and to enter into and perform ail of its obligations 
under this Agreement 
(3) This Agreement has been duly authorized by Lessor and constitutes the valid, 
legal and binding obligation of Lessee enforceable in accordance with its 
terms. 
18. COVENANT OF QUIET POSSESSION: 
Lessor agrees that so long as no Event of Default has occurred and is continuing, Lessee shall 
be entitled to quietly possess the Equipment subject to an in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of this Agreement 
19. GENERAL: 
(a) This Agreement together with any Supplements or Riders hereto and Equipment 
Schedules executed hereunder shall constitute the entire agreement between the parties with respect 
to the items of Equipment listed on each such Equipment Schedule. 
(b) This Lease may not be amended or modified except by a writing signed by a duly 
authorized representative of each party. 
(c) The invalidity of any provision hereof shall not affect the validity or binding effect of 
any other provision hereof. 
(d) No failure of either party to exercise any right or remedy will constitute a waiver 
thereof. 
(e) Notices hereunder shall be in writing and addressed to the other party at the address 
herein or such other address provided by notice hereunder and shall be effective upon dispatch if by 
telegram, telex or similar means and, if mailed, shall be effective three (3) days after deposit in the 
channels of the U.S. mails, postage prepaid and addressed to the other party. 
(f) Paragraph headings are provided for convenience of reference only and shall not limit 
or modify any term thereof. 
(g) This Lease shall be governed by and shall be interpreted pursuant to the laws of the 
State of Utah. 
(h) Lessee shall provide to Lessor copies of its annual audited financial statements. 
(i) With respect to each Equipment Schedule, Lessee shall provide to Lessor an opinion 
of its counsel as to Lessee's representations and warranties contained in this Agreement. 
(j) In the event a court of competent jurisdiction or other governing" authority shall 
determine that this Agreement is not a "true lease" or that Lessor (or its assigns) does not hold legal 
title to or is not the owner of the Equipment, then this Agreement shall be deemed to be a security 
agreement with Lessee, as debtor, having granted to Lessor, as secured party, a security interest in 
the Equipment effective the date of this Agreement; and Lessor shall have all of the rights, privileges 
and remedies of a secured party under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, which shall constitute 
the governing law for this Agreement 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Lessor and Lessee have executed this Agreement on the day and 
year first above written. 
LESSOR: LESSEE: 
MATRIX FUNDING CORPORATION 
BY: BY: _ _ 
TITLE: TITLE: 
EXHIBIT mC 
MATRIX FUNDING CORPORATION 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 250 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
EQUIPMENT SCHEDULE NO. 1 
SCHEDULE DATE-
To Master Lease Agreement, dated , between MATRIX FUNDING CORPORATION 
as Lessor and
 9 as Lessee. The terms and conditions of the Master Lease 
Agreement are incorporated herein by reference, 
1. Equipment: See Attached Schedules 
2. Equipment Location: See Attached Schedules 
3. Acceptance Date: Acceptance Date of the Equipment as specified in the Certificate 
of Acceptance. 
4. Commencement Date: Upon Funding 
5. Initial Period: 60 months from Commencement Date. 
6. Monthly Rental in Arrears: $ A 
7. Contingent Rentals. The Consumer Price Index for the United States ("CPr) shall mean the 
U.S. City Average All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). The CPI in effect for this equipment schedule 
is and is rcfered to herein as the "Base CPI\ 
Rental Adjustment During the first twelve months of the lease if there have been any 
monthly increases above the Base CPI since the inception of the Lease, then the monthly rental for 
the remainder of the Lease shall be increased to $ B per month beginning with the thirteenth 
month. 
Lessee's Option to Pay Contingent Rentals. In the event there occurs no increase in the CPI, 
Lessee shall have the option to elect all future monthly rental payments to increase as provided in 
the preceding paragraph of this Section such that Lessee shall pay the higher contingent rentals for 
all remaining months of the Lease, in which case Lessee shall have the option-at the end of the Lease 
to purchase all, but not less than all, of the Equipment for a price of 3 c .In the event 
contingent rentals become due and payable under any Equipment Schedule under the Lease, they 
shall become due and payable under this Equipment Schedule. 
8. Purchase Option. So long as no default exists hereunder and the lease has not been early 
terminated, Lessee may at lease expiration, upon at least ninety (90) days prior written notice to 
Lessor purchase all of the equipment described in said Schedule (and not merely a part thereof) upon 
the expiration of the initial lease term for S D The said purchase price shall be due and 
payable by Lessee in full within ten (10) days after expiration of the initial lease term. 
If all Contingent Rental Payments have been made, the Purchase Option shall be reduced 
to an amount of $ C 
In the event Lessee does not elect to exercise the Purchase Option and returns the 
Equipment to Lessor, Lessee shall pay to Lessor-an amount of $ C upon return of the 
Equipment 
Upon receipt by the Lessor of the full purchase price, Lessor will furnish Lessee with a bill 
of sale warranting good title to the equipment, but excepting any impairment thereof by reason of 
any acts by the Lessee or those making claim against the Lessee. The bill of sale will also provide 
that the purchase shall be "as is", Vhere is" and without any other warranties, express or implied. 
Dated: 
LESSOR: LESSEE: 
MATRIX FUNDING CORPORATION _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
By: By:_ 
Title: Title: 
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APPENDIX E 
APPENDIX E 
Determinative Statutes and Regulations 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102 f1992) 
(10) "Sale" means any transfer of title, exchange, or barter, 
conditional or otherwise, in any manner, of tangible 
personal property or any other taxable item or service under 
Subsection 59-12-103(1), for a consideration. It includes: 
(a) installment and credit sales; 
(b) any closed transaction constituting a sale; 
(c) any sale of electrical energy, gas, services, or 
entertainment taxable under this chapter; 
(d) any transaction if the possession of property is 
transferred but the seller retains the title as 
security for the payment of the price; and 
(e) any transaction under which right to possession, 
operation, or use of any article of tangible personal 
property is granted under a lease or contract and the 
transfer of possession would be taxable if an outright 
sale were made. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1992) 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid 
or charged for the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made within 
the state; 
(k) leases and rentals of tangible personal property if the 
property situs is in this state, if the lessee took 
possession in this state, or if the property is stored, 
used, or otherwise consumed in this state; and 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-12-104 (1992) 
(27) property purchased for resale in this state, in the regular 
course of business, either in its original form or as an 
ingredient or component part of a manufactured or compounded 
product; 
Utah Code Ann. 5 59-1-610 (S.B. No. 243 (1993) 
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings commenced 
before the commission, the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court 
shall: 
(a) grant the commission deference concerning its written 
findings of fact, applying a substantial evidence 
standard on review; and 
(b) grant the commission no deference concerning its 
conclusions of law, applying a correction of error 
standard, unless there is an explicit grant of 
discretion contained in a statute at issue before the 
appellate court• 
(2) This section supercedes Section 63-46b-16 pertaining to 
judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201 (37^ (Supp. 1989^ (amended 19901 Tin 
relevant parti 
Whether a lease is intended as security is to be 
determined by the facts of each case; however, (a) the 
inclusion of an option to purchase does not itself make 
the lease one intended for security, and (b) an 
agreement that upon compliance with the term of the 
lease the lessee shall become or has the option to 
become the owner of the property for no additional 
consideration or for a nominal consideration does make 
the lease one intended for security. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201 (37)(b) (19901 
(b) Whether a transaction creates a lease or security 
interest is determined by the facts of each case; 
however, a transaction creates a security interest if 
the consideration the lessee is to pay the lessor for 
the right to possession and use of the goods is an 
obligation for the term of the lease not subject to 
termination by the lessee, and: 
(i) the original term of the lease is equal to or 
greater than the remaining economic life of the 
goods; 
(ii) the lessee is bound to renew the lease for the 
remaining economic life of the goods or is bound 
to become the owner of the goods; 
(iii) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for 
the remaining economic life of the goods for no 
additional consideration or nominal additional 
consideration upon compliance with the lease 
agreement; or 
(iv) the lessee has an option to become the owner of 
the goods for no additional consideration or 
nominal additional consideration upon compliance 
with the lease agreement. 
A transaction does not create a security interest 
merely because it provides that: 
(i) the present value of the consideration the lessee 
is obligated to pay the lessor for the right to 
possession and use of the goods is substantially 
equal to or is greater than the fair market value 
of the goods at the time the lease is entered 
into; 
(ii) the lessee assumes risk of loss of the goods, or 
agrees to pay taxes, insurance, filing, recording, 
or registration fees, or service or maintenance 
costs with respect to the goods; 
(iii) the lessee has an option to renew the lease or to 
become the owner of the goods; 
(iv) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for a 
fixed rent that is equal to or greater than the 
reasonably predictable fair market rent for the 
use of the goods for the term of the renewal at 
the time the option is to be performed; or 
(v) the lessee has an option to become the owner of 
the goods for a fixed price that is equal to or 
greater than the reasonably predictable fair 
market value of the goods at the time the option 
is to be performed. 
For purposes of this subsection: 
(i) Additional consideration is not nominal if, when 
the option to renew the lease is granted to the 
lessee, the rent is stated to be the fair market 
rent for the use of the goods for the term of the 
renewal determined at the time the option is to be 
performed, or when the option to become the owner 
of the goods is granted to the lessee the price is 
stated to be the fair market value of the goods 
determined at the time the option is to be 
performed. 
(ii) Additional consideration is nominal if it is less 
than the lessee's reasonably predictable cost of 
performing under the lease agreement if the option 
is not exercised. 
(iii) "Reasonably predictable" and "remaining economic 
life of the goods" are to be determined with 
reference to the facts and circumstances at the 
time the transaction is entered into. 
(iv) "Present value" means the amount as of a date 
certain of one or more sums payable in the future, 
discounted to the date certain. The discount is 
determined by the interest rate specified by the 
parties if the rate is not manifestly unreasonable at 
the time the transaction is entered into; otherwise, 
the discount is determined by a commercially reasonable 
rate that takes into account the facts and 
circumstances of each case at the time the transaction 
was entered into. 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES: 
Utah Admin. R. R865-19-32S (1992^ 
F. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this rule, a 
lessee may, at its option, treat a conditional sale lease as 
either a sale or lease for sales or use tax purposes. 
A conditional sales lease is a lease in which: 
1. the consideration the lessee is to pay the 
lessor for the right to possession and use of 
the property is an obligation for the term of 
the lease not subject to termination by the 
lessee, and 
2. the total consideration to be paid by the lessee 
is fixed at the time the lease is executed and 
cannot be modified by use, condition, or market 
value, and either: 
a. the lessee is bound to become the owner of the 
property; or 
b. the lessee has an option to become the owner of 
the property for no additional consideration or 
nominal additional consideration upon compliance 
with the lease agreement. Nominal consideration in 
this sense means ten percent or less of the 
original lease amount. 
G. If the lessee treats a conditional sale lease as a sale, and 
if the lessor is also the vendor of the property, the sales 
price for sales tax purposes must be at least equal to the 
average sales price of similar property. 
H. If the lessee treats a conditional sale lease as a 
sale, the sales tax must be collected by the lessor on 
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NOTICE OF DECISION: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
The State Board of Tax Appeals, Division Two, having considered all evidence 
and arguments presented, and having taken the matter under advisement, finds 
and concludes as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Blue Cross ( B Q is an insurance company which conducts business within the 
state of Arizona. In the spring of 1986, BC decided to acquire a computer 
through a sa le-leaseback transaction. It subsequently placed an order with 
Appellant, Honeywell Bull, and began discussing sa le-leaseback arrangements 
with equipment leasing companies. 
Honeywell Bull installed and tested the computer ahead of schedule. When 
payment was requested, BC had not yet committed to a sale-leaseback arrangement 
with a leasing company, so it decided to pay for the computer with a bank line 
of credit. On Jury 16, 1986, BC paid Honeywell Bull a total of $5,178,757.53 
which included Arizona transaction privilege tax, Maricopa County excise tax, 
and City of Phoenix transaction privilege tax. 
BC needed to complete the sa le-leaseback transaction before the end of 1986 
because: a) its line of credit would become due; and, b) it would fail to 
comply with the data processing investment limitation of A.R.S. s 20-560 if the 
computer were still showing on its 1986 annual statement. 
Appellant, CRA Inc., submitted a sa le-leaseback proposal to BC on August 18, 
1986. After numerous discussions, BC entered into a sale-lcaseback agreement 
with CRA Inc. on December 17, 1986. BC sold the computer for $4,885,834, and 
leased it back for $96,175 per month plus all applicable taxes. BCs total 
monthly payment of $102,618.75 includes Arizona transaction privilege tax, 
Maricopa County excise tax, and City of Phoenix transaction privilege tax. On 
May 7, 1987, BC issued a retroactive Arizona resale certificate to Honeywell 
Bull which certified that it was engaged in the business of selling insurance 
and that it purchased the computer for resale in the regular course of 
business. 
Appellants subsequently submitted claims for refundto the Arizona Department 
of Revenue (Department) for the Arizona transaction privilege taxes paid by BC 
when the computer was purchased from Honeywell Bull and when BC made each 
monthly rental payment to CRA Inc. The bases for Appellants' claims are that: 
a) the sale of the computer to BC was a tax exempt sale for resale; b) the 
acquisition of the computer was a single transaction that should be subject to 
Arizona transaction privilege taxes only one time; and, c) the salc/leaseback 
of the computer was solely a financing transaction which is not subject to 
Arizona transaction privilege taxes. 
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The Department denied Appellants' claims. Appellants protested the denials, 
and the Department held an administrative hearing on the matter on November 22, 
1988. 'Die Hearing Officer denied Appellants' protests, concluding that: a) 
Honeywell Bull sold the computer to BC in a retail sale subject to the 
transaction privilege tax; and, b) BC sold the computer to CRA Inc., which 
leased it back to BC; The gross receipts from the lease are subject to the 
transaction privilege tax. 
*2 Appellants timely appealed the decision of the Hearing Officer to this 
Board on the same grounds. The Department contends that: a) Honeywell Bull's 
sale of the computer was not a sale for resale; b) Honeywell Bull's sale of 
the computer to BC may not be viewed as a single transaction with the 
sale/leascback between BC and CRA Inc.; and, c) the sale/leaseback was not a 
mere financing transaction. 
DISCUSSION 
Was the Sale of the Computer to BC a Sale for Resale?: 
There is a transaction privilege tax levied upon the business of selling 
tangible personal property at retail. A.R.S. s 42-1315 (1986). A sale at 
retail is defined as a sale for any purpose other than for resale in the 
regular course of business in the form of tangible personal property. 
s 42-1301(18) (1986). The burden of proving that a sale of tangible personal 
property was not a sale shall be upon the person who made it, unless such 
person has taken from the purchaser a certificate signed by and bearing the 
name and address of the purchaser that the property was purchased for resale in 
the ordinary course of business and that he has a valid license, with the 
number thereof, to sell the kind of property purchased. A.R.S. s 42-1328 
(1986). 
Honeywell Bull contends that it has met its burden of proof because BC 
provided it with a resale certificate some 10 months after the sale of the 
computer. The Department argues that Honeywell has failed to meet its burden 
because: a) BC is not in the business of selling computers, so the resale 
cannot be in the ordinary course of BCs business as required by statute and 
A.A.C. R15-5-18U(A); b) without a valid resale certificate at the time of 
purchase, Honeywell Bull's claim that BC intended to resell the computer is 
insufficient to meet its burden of proof; and, c) Honeywell Bull has not 
demonstrated that it maintains resale records separately from its retail 
records. 
In Mountain Coin Machine Distributors, Docket No. 385-85-S, (Ariz.B.T.A., Div. 
2 Apr. 7, 1987), the Appellant was engaged in the business of selling video 
game machines. Appellant did not pay the transaction privilege tax on gross 
receipts of sales to "turnkey operators" who were in the business of setting up 
arcades and then selling them. 
Although the Department demonstrated that some of the customers who provided 
resale certificates at the time of sale did not purchase Appellant's goods for 
resale, the Appellant in this case had a good faith belief and a reasonable 
basis to believe that those customers did in fact buy its goods for resale. 
This Board found that the Appellant had met the burden of proof necessary to 
show that its sales were exempt from the transaction privilege tax by producing 
resale certificates pursuant to A.R.S. s 42-1328 which were obtained at the 
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time of the sales. Sec Mountain Coin, slip op. at 3. 
In the case at bar, there arc significant factual differences: a) BC was not 
in the business of selling computers like the one it purchased from Honeywell 
Bull; b) there was no reasonable basis for Honeywell Bull to believe that BC 
sold such computers, especially since the computer was purchased for use to 
process BCs subscriber claims; and, c) the resale certificate was not 
provided at the time of the sale. 
•3 liven if Honeywell Bull were able to show that it keeps separate records 
for retail and resale sales, it has not met the burden of proving a sale for 
resale outlined in Mountain Coin. Id. 
Was the Acquisition of the Computer a Single Transaction?: 
The burden of proof is upon the Appellants as to all issues of fact. A . A . C 
R16-31I8(1980) . 
Although Appellants contend that the acquisition of the computer should be 
considered as a single transaction, they fail to provide any legal support for 
this argument. Even if BCs intent was for this entire matter to constitute 
one transaction, Appellants have not demonstrated that BCs intent is a legally 
sufficient basis to deem this to be one transaction. Appellants have failed to 
meet the burden of proof with regard to this issue. 
Was the vSalc/I leaseback a Mere Financing Arrangement?: 
Appellants rely heavily upon this Board's decision in Mark Realty Development 
Inc. v. Ariz. Dept. of Revenue, Docket No. 357-85-S (Ariz.BTA, Div. 2 Feb. 5, 
1987) in advocating the position that the sale and leaseback of the computer 
was a non-taxable financing arrangement. Appellants assert that the Board's 
holding in the case exempted capital lease payments from the transaction 
privilege tax. Appellants* reliance is misplaced, as Mark Realty has little, 
if any applicability to the case at bar. 
A. Mark Realty 
The issue in Mark Realty was whether or not a contract to develop and operate 
a workcamp facility was a lease of real property which established a landlord-
tenant relationship. Mark Realty, slip op. at 4. The focus of the decision 
was upon leases of real property rather than leases of chattel. See id. at 4-
12. 
The discussion of capital lease financing in Mark Realty was just one part of 
a five-step analysis to determine whether the contract in question had the 
attributes necessary to be considered a lease of real property. Id. at 9-10. 
The holding of the decision was that there was neither a lease nor a landlord-
tenant relationship established by the contract. Id. at 13. 
B. Sale/Leaseback Transactions 
In the federal income tax area, sale/lcascback transactions have been given 
some beneficial treatment. Sec Equipment leasing, Tax Mgmt. (BNA) 12-6th, p. 
A-2; 1 S. Gucrin, Taxation of Real Estate Dispositions 6-40 (1982). There arc 
no similar provisions in the Arizona transaction privilege tax statutes. Sec 
generally A R.S. ss 42-1301 to -1347 (1988). In a financial leasing situation, 
a known disadvantage to the seller-lessee is that the lessee will contract to 
maintain the equipment, insure it, and pay all taxes in connection with it; 
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payment of sales tax on rental payments are included. See Ixjuipmcnt leasing, 
Tax Mgmt. (BNA) !2-6th. p. A-2; 1 S. Guerin, Taxation of Real Estate 
Dispositions 6-40 (1982). 
In Arizona, receipts derived from engaging in the business of leasing or 
renting personal property arc taxable. A.R.S. s 42-1310 (1988). BC sold the 
Honeywell computer to CRA, and then entered into a lease agreement with CRA for 
the computer. CRA is undisputedry in the business of leasing and renting 
personal property for a consideration. CRA is thereby liable for the 
transaction privilege tax on the rental receipts, despite the fact that this 
transaction may have been structured to facilitate financing of the DP-90 
computer. Sec id. The incidence of the tax is on CRA, not BC; CRA is not 
legally required to pass the cost of the tax on to its customers. See 
generally A.R.S. ss 42-1301 to -1347 (1988). The Department cannot be expected 
to subsidize BCs failure to contemplate all known ramifications of a sale-
leaseback transaction. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
•4 1. The sale of the computer by Honeywell to BC was not a tax-exempt sale 
for resale. Sec Mountain Coin, slip op. at 3. 
2. Appellants have failed to meet its burden of proving that the purchase and 
subsequent sale-leaseback of the computer by BC constituted one transaction. 
A. A G R16-3-118(1980). 
3. Mark Realty did not hold that capital lease payments are not subject to the 
transaction privilege tax. Id. at 13. 
4. A known disadvantage to lessees in sale-leaseback transactions is sales tax 
in proportion to the amount of rentals paid. See Equipment Leasing, Tax Mgmt. 
(BNA) 12-6th, at A-2; 1 S. Guerin, Taxation of Real Estate Dispositions at 6-
40(1982). 
5. The Arizona transaction privilege statutes do not give beneficial treatment 
to sale-leaseback transactions. See generally A.RS. ss 42-1301 to -1347 
(1988). 
6. CRA is liable for the transaction privilege tax on rental receipts from 
BC A.RS. s 42-1310 (1988). 
7. The Department's denial of Appellants' refund claims was valid. 
ORDER 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellants' appeal is denied, and 
that 
the Final Order of the Department Director is affirmed. 
This decision becomes final upon the expiration of thirty (30) days from 
receipt, unless cither the State or the taxpayer brings an action in Superior 
Court as provided in A.RS. s 12-124. 
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